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Abstract. We estimate quality-of-life and productivity differences across Canada’s
metropolitan areas in a hedonic general-equilibrium framework. These are based on
the estimated willingness-to-pay of heterogeneous households and firms to locate in
various cities, which differ in their wage levels, housing costs, and land values. Using
2006 Canadian Census data, our metropolitan quality-of-life estimates are somewhat
consistent with popular rankings, yet find Canadians care more about climate and culture.
Quality of life is highest in Victoria for anglophones, Montreal for francophones, and
Vancouver for allophones, and lowest in more remote cities. Toronto is Canada’s most
productive city; Vancouver is the overall most valuable city. JEL classification: J61, R1
Qualite´ de vie, productivite´ des entreprises, et la valeur des avantages dans les diverses
villes canadiennes. On e´value les diffe´rences entre la qualite´ de vie et la productivite´
des entreprises entre les zones me´tropolitaines au Canada a` l’aide d’un cadre d’analyse
d’e´quilibre ge´ne´ral he´donique. Ces me´triques sont base´es sur l’estimation de la volonte´
de payer de me´nages et d’entreprises he´te´roge`nes pour se localiser dans diverses villes,
qui diffe`rent tant pour ce qui est des niveaux de salaires, des couˆts de l’habitation, et des
prix des terrains. A l’aide des donne´es du recensement canadien de 2006, on construit
des e´valuations de la qualite´ de vie des diverses zones me´tropolitaines qui s’arriment
convenablement aux ordonnancements en vogue, mais on de´couvre que les Canadiens
portent une attention particulie`re au climat et a` la culture. La qualite´ de vie est la plus
e´leve´e a` Victoria pour les anglophones, a` Montreal pour les francophones, et a` Vancouver
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pour les allophones, et la plus faible pour les villes e´loigne´es des grands centres. Toronto
est la ville la plus productive; Vancouver est ge´ne´ralement la plus appre´cie´e.
1. Introduction
Wage and cost-of-living levels vary significantly across Canadian cities and
provinces, despite the fact that capital and labour are largely mobile within
Canada’s borders. Coulombe and Lee (1995) and Coulombe (2000) find that
income and price levels converged significantly between 1960 and 1980, but have
converged relatively little since then. These persistent differences in wages and
prices are most naturally explained by persistent differences in local advantages
to households and firms, broadly termed as ‘amenities.’ To clarify terminology,
we say consumption amenities determine an area’s overall quality of life (QOL),
while production amenities determine an area’s overall productivity. The pri-
mary goal of this paper is to identify the overall differences in quality-of-life and
productivity levels across Canadian cities.
Some places in Canada have undeniable advantages over others. Most Cana-
dians live south, close to the United States border, where the climate is warmer
and trading costs are lower than further north. Canadians are acutely aware of
regional disparities in natural resource wealth: from oil in Alberta, forests in
British Columbia, potash in Saskatchewan, to depleted fish stocks in the At-
lantic provinces. Much of the population is concentrated in a handful of large
cities, which benefit from sizable agglomeration economies and vast cultural op-
portunities, but also suffer disproportionately from urban disamenities such as
crime, pollution, and congestion. Strong local and provincial governments, as
well as differential treatment of regions by the federal government, also lead to
geographic differences in public services and taxation.
While some places appear more advantaged than others, much of the popula-
tion is still located in less advantaged areas. Although heterogeneity in household
tastes and production technologies may help explain this, the importance of het-
erogeneity should not be overstated: most individuals prefer temperatures above
−40, and most firms benefit from low transportation costs. Furthermore, many
Canadians are quite mobile over their lifetime and have only limited local attach-
ments (e.g., Bernard, Finnie, and St-Jean 2008).
In this setting, households and firms in areas with less advantageous amenities
should be largely compensated by more advantageous local prices. Specifically,
households in areas with lower QOL should be compensated through either
higher nominal wages or lower costs of living. Firms in less productive areas
should be compensated through either lower labour or non-labour costs. This
is the essence of the methodology of Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982), which
has been used extensively by researchers to measure QOL and productivity dif-
ferences in the United States (e.g., Blomquist, Berger, and Hoehn 1988; Beeson
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and Eberts 1989; Gyourko and Tracy 1991; Gabriel and Rosenthal 2004; Shapiro
2006; Chen and Rosenthal 2008).
Surprisingly, this popular methodology has never been applied to Canadian
data. We explain this theory in section 2, using the framework by Albouy (2008a,
2009b), which realistically incorporates federal taxes and produced non-tradable
goods, such as housing. In section 3, we explain how to calibrate this model for
Canada, and use the 2006 Census microdata to estimate wage and housing-cost
differences across Census Metropolitan Areas (CMAs), so as to infer QOL and
productivity differences across CMAs.
Several issues arise in applying theRosen-Roback framework toCanada.First,
while most areas of Canada are mainly English speaking, areas such as Quebec,
are predominantly French speaking, while areas such as New Brunswick, are
largely bilingual. Different language groups naturally have preferences for differ-
ent areas, as most would prefer to live where their mother tongue is predominant.
Roback (1988) and Beeson (1991) estimate QOL advantages for different groups
defined by education groups; we estimate QOL for groups defined by mother
tongue, a more predetermined characteristic. We also discuss, for what appears
to be the first time, how the model may be aggregated across types and be used
to estimate productivity differences between groups.
Second, unionization rates in Canada are still high relative to those of the
United States, but vary across regions. This means that some areas may have
high real wage levels not because of low amenities, but because of a strong union
presence. We find it most plausible to assume that union wage premia do not
reflect urban productivity or QOL differences, and use wage estimates purged of
unionization effects.
Third, federal and provincial governments play a large role in taxing income
and redistributing it through intergovernmental transfers. The role of taxes on
residents is dealt with in the model following adjustments in Albouy (2008a,
2009a). It is less clear how the model should accommodate intergovernmental
transfers and fiscal disparities due to natural resource wealth, documented in
Albouy (2012). Thus, we exclude these from the main analysis, and consider
them in alternative results at the end.
According to our estimates in section 4, the CMAwith the highest QOL is Vic-
toria, followed by the other British Columbian CMAs of Vancouver, Kelowna,
Abbotsford, and then Toronto, Calgary, and Montreal. The rankings for differ-
ent language groups are rather consistent across CMAs with sufficiently large
populations of each: anglophones, francophones, and allophones all seem to
prefer Montreal to Ottawa-Hull.
Our estimates of firm productivity in tradables, also the first of their kind for
Canada, reveal Toronto to be the most productive CMA, followed by Calgary,
Oshawa, Vancouver, and Ottawa-Hull. While the QOL of anglophones in Mon-
treal appears to be almost the same as in Toronto, their productivity is lower
than that of anglophones in Kingston. This is consistent with the reasoning in
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Albouy (2008b) that, since 1970, anglophones fledMontreal more from a loss of
jobs than from a loss of amenities.
Under the assumption that there are no sizable differences in unobservable
firm productivity in non-tradables, we create aggregate measures of land rents
and the combined value of urban amenities to households and firms. According
to this metric, the most valuable CMA per hectare is Vancouver, followed by
Victoria, Toronto, Calgary, Kelowna, and Montreal.
While QOL greatly interests policy-makers and the general population, pub-
lished indicators of QOL for Canadian cities consist broadly of weighted sums of
arbitrarily chosen amenities, with ad hoc weights. Such indices are found inCities
Ranked &Rated,Places Rated Almanac, andMercer’s Quality-of-Living Reports.
These are informative only to the extent that the ad hocweighting schemes used in
their calculations actually reflect peoples’ values. The willingness-to-paymethod-
ology implemented here instead makes use of data on local wages and housing
costs to identify the aggregate value of the different amenities. We show in sec-
tion 5 that our estimates are generally in line with the popular rankings, but that
households put more weight on climate and arts and culture. Finally, in section
6 we consider how our estimates would be influenced by including intergovern-
mental transfers, alternative price data from the CPI, or using housing-cost data
from rental units alone.1
2. Theoretical model of spatial equilibrium
Quality-of-life and productivity differences across cities are measured from wage
and housing-cost differences across cities using the theoretical framework of
Albouy (2008a, 2009a). This framework builds upon that of Rosen (1979) and
Roback (1982), but also accounts for non-labour income, housing production,
cost-of-living differences from non-housing sources, and inequalities in both
federal and provincial taxation. Furthermore, like Roback (1988) and Beeson
(1991) we account for multiple household types, but in a richer setting that deals
with aggregation and productivity measurement.
1 To our knowledge, the only attempt to measure QOL across Canadian cities in an economic
framework, distantly related to the one here, is Giannias (1998), who does so for 13 cities using
1981 data. This work measures QOL according to how housing costs co-vary with six amenity
measures, controlling for three housing characteristics, and assuming that incomes do not
depend on where households locate. This methodology depends on a highly parametric model
with strict normality assumptions and a linear housing price equation, which departs from
more established log-linear specifications. Our model instead endogenizes wage differences,
controls for many worker and housing characteristics, is independent of any set of chosen
amenities, and is illustrated through graphs mapping the relationship of wage and housing-cost
differences to QOL and productivity differences. Furthermore, our analysis covers all 33
currently defined Census Metropolitan Areas (CMAs), which we sometimes refer to as ‘cities,’
as well as the non-metropolitan areas of Canada, organized by province or territory.
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2.1. Setup
The national economy contains many cities, indexed by j, which trade with each
other and share several types of mobile households, indexed by g ∈ {1, . . . ,G}.
The population in city j is denoted as the vectorNj = (Nj1, . . . ,NjG). Each house-
hold consumes a numeraire traded good, x, and a group-specific non-traded local
good,2 yg, with local price, p
j
g, which varies by city and type. This accounts for the
possibility that households may consume housing in different neighbourhoods
or goods produced disproportionately by their own type (e.g., anglophones in
Montreal live in certain neighbourhoods and are more likely to consume services
produced by other anglophones). In the empirical implementation of the model,
the price of local goods for type g is equated with the cost of housing paid by
that type.3
Firms produce traded and local goods out of land, capital, and labour.Within
a city, factors receive the same payment in either sector. Land, L, within each
city is homogeneous and immobile, and is paid a city-specific price rj; each
city’s land supply, Lj(r), may depend positively on rj, with a finite elasticity
ε
j
L,r ∈ [0.∞).4 Capital, K , is costlessly mobile across cities, and is paid the price
i¯ everywhere: this price may be set either nationally or internationally, although
for simplicity net foreign asset holdings are set to zero. Households of each
type g, Ng, are perfectly mobile within the country, have identical tastes and
endowments, and each supplies a single unit of labour. Because households care
about local prices andQOL,wages, denotedby the vectorwj = (wjg, . . . , wjG),may
vary across cities. The national number of worker-households is fixed atNTOT =
(NTOT1 , . . . ,N
TOT
G ), so that the sum of populations across cities
∑
j N
j = NTOT .
Households of each type own identical diversified portfolios of land and capital,
which pay an income Rg from land and Ig from capital, regardless of the city
they live in. Gross income, mjg ≡ Rg + Ig + wjg, varies across cities only as wages
vary. Out of this income households pay a federal income tax of τ (mg), which is
redistributed in lump-sum transfers, Tjg, which may vary by city. For expositional
ease, provincial taxes are discussed in the online technical appendix.5
2 The productivity differences in non-traded goods may be quite variable. Without separate data
on land values across cities, it is nearly impossible to identify them. However, Albouy (2009b)
shows that this does not bias the quality-of-life estimates and has only a minor bias on the
trade-productivity estimates for reasonable calibrations.
3 As shown in Roback (1980), the use of a single traded good may be used to approximate the
case of multiple goods. Factor-price equalization, as in the Hecksher-Ohlin model of trade, does
not occur, because factors are mobile and many cities may specialize in the production of fewer
tradable goods than factors. Furthermore, non-housing goods may be considered to be a
combination of traded goods and non-housing local goods.
4 The assumption of homogeneous land is used for simplicity, as we do not directly observe land
values in any of our datasets. As discussed in Albouy and Lue (2011), land values within CMAs
may differ significantly because of local amenities as well as transportation costs. Our estimates
may be taken as an average of the value of land within a city. Our QOL estimates implicitly
include a penalty for areas with higher transportation costs.
5 The technical appendix is available from the CJE online archive at cje.economics.ca.
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Cities differ in two types of attributes: quality of life, which raises house-
hold utility and is given by the vector Qj = (Qj1, . . . ,QjG), and productivity
in the traded-good sector, which varies by factor and is given by the vector
Aj = (Aj1, . . . ,AjG,AjL,AjK ). These attributes, in turn, depend on a vector of
amenities, Zj = (Zj1, . . . ,Zjk¯), natural or artificial, according to some unknown
functionsQj = Q˜(Zj) and Aj = A˜(Zj). For a consumption amenity, for example,
safety or clement weather, ∂Q˜g/∂Zk > 0; for a production amenity, navigable wa-
ter or agglomeration economies, ∂A˜g/∂Zk > 0. It is possible that a single amenity
affects both productivity and QOL.6
Household preferences are modelled by a utility functionUg(x, yg;Qg), which
is quasi-concave over x and yg, and increasing in Qg. The expenditure function
for a worker of type g in city j is eg(p
j
g, ug;Q
j
g) ≡ minx,y{x+ pjgy : Ug(x, y;Qjg) ≥
ug}. Qg is normalized so that eg(pjg, u¯g;Qjg) = eg(pjg, u¯g)/Qjg, where eg(pjg, u¯g) ≡
eg(p
j
g, u¯g; 1), meaning that a 1% increase in Qg is equivalent to a 1% increase in
disposable income. Since households are fully mobile, their utility must be the
same across all the cities that they inhabit. Thus, the after-tax income households
earn in each city should equal the expenditure needed to obtain the common level
of utility, u¯g, given local prices and QOL:7
eg
(
pjg, u¯g;Q
j
g
) = mjg − τ (mjg)+ Tjg (1)
for all types g and cities j where Njg > 0.
All input and goods markets are perfectly competitive, and firms pro-
duce under constant returns to scale. Let the vector AjN = (Aj1, . . . ,AjG) de-
note only labour productivity, the vector NjX = (Nj1X , . . . ,NjGX ) denote labour
used to produce the traded good, and NjYg = (NjYg1, . . . ,NjYgG) denote the
labour used to produce each local good g, with NjY =
∑
gN
j
Yg; similar nota-
tion is used for land and capital, with LjY =
∑
g L
j
Yg, and so on. Then the
production functions of representative traded-good and local-good firms are
Xj = FX (AjN · NjX ,AjLLjX ,AjKKjX ) and Yjg = FYg(NjYg,LjYg,KjYg), for all g, where
FX and FYg are concave and exhibit constant returns to scale. All factors
are fully employed: NjX + NjY = Nj, LjX + LjY = Lj and KjX + KjY = Kj. Unit
6 It is worth noting that amenities may be endogenous to quantities in the model, and that this
poses different problems when values are measured by using comparative statics. For example,
an increase in population, Nj , may lead to greater pollution, lowering Qj . If a city were to
receive a theme-park, improving Q, this would raise N, raising pollution and indirectly
decreasing Q. The value of the theme-park could be measured empirically by controlling for
pollution, although the value when accounting for pollution externalities should not control for
pollution. Both direct and indirect effects of amenities have to be taken into account when using
comparative statics to determine the causal effect of an amenity on the attributes and prices in a
city.
7 The mobility condition need not apply to all households, but only to a sufficiently large subset
of mobile marginal households.
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cost in the traded-good sector is cX (wj, rj, i¯;Aj) ≡ minN,L,K{wj · N + rjL+ i¯K :
FX (A
j
N · NjX ,AjLLjX ,AjKKjX ) = 1}. As markets are competitive, firms make zero
profits in equilibrium, so that
cX (wj, rj, i¯;Aj) = 1 (2)
in all cities j. A symmetric definition holds for the unit costs in the local-good
sectors, cYg, except that, because of data limitations, we assume uniform produc-
tivity for all g and j
cYg(wj, rj, i¯) = pjg (3)
for all types g and cities j where Njg > 0.
Scalars with superscripts j refer to city-specific values, while those without su-
perscripts refer to national averages. The share of all income that goes to house-
holds of type g is denotedμg ≡ NTOTg mg/(
∑
g′ N
TOT
g′ mg′ ), withμ = (μ1, . . . , μG);
within a city, the comparable notation is μj = (μj1, . . . , μjG). For households,
denote the average share of gross expenditures spent on traded goods and lo-
cal goods as sxg ≡ xg/mg and syg ≡ pgyg/mg; denote the shares of income re-
ceived from labour, land, and capital income as swg ≡ wg/mg, sRg ≡ Rg/mg, and
sIg ≡ Ig/mg. Each share may be put into a vector of the form sx = (sx1, . . . , sxG).
Using averages, it is possible to write the aggregate expenditure shares, sy = μ·sy,
and income shares sw = μ·sw, and so on. For firms producing traded goods, de-
note the cost shares of labour, land, and capital as θNg ≡ wgNXg/X , θL ≡ rLX/X ,
and θK ≡ i¯KX/X , with θN = (θN1, . . . , θNG), and the overall labour-cost share
θN =
∑
g θNg. Denote similarly defined cost shares in the local-good sector φgN ,
φgL, and φgK , with the cost-share of local good g from labour type g′ given by
φgNg′ , so that φgN = (φgN1, . . . , φgNG).
2.2. Measuring quality of life and productivity
We begin by considering the case in which there is only one type of household,
and productivity is factor neutral; that is, AjN = AjL = AjK = Aj. We continue
with an explanation of multiple types, showing under what assumptions we may
aggregate results to reproduce the single-type case.
2.2.1. Single household type
To analyze the effect of city attributes on prices we log-linearize the equilibrium
conditions (1), (2), and (3) around the national average. Thus, for any variable
z, zˆj = ln zj − ln z¯ ∼= (zj − z¯)/z¯, approximates the percentage difference in city
j of z relative to the geometric average z¯, which is the value for a nationally
representative city. Log-linearized versions of (1), (2), and (3) describe how prices
386 D. Albouy, F. Leibovici, and C. Warman
co-vary with city attributes:
Qˆj = sypˆj − sw(1 − τ ′)wˆj − dTj/m (4a)
Aˆj = θNwˆj + θLrˆj (4b)
pˆj =φNwˆj + φLrˆj. (4c)
These equations are first-order approximations around a nationally representa-
tive city, and so the share values are national averages. Equation (4a) measures
the QOL differential, Qˆj, from how high the cost of living, sypˆj, is relative to
after-tax nominal income, sw(1 − τ ′)wˆj, and transfer differences, expressed as a
fraction of income, dTj/m. Thus, Qˆj expresses the fraction of income households
are willing to pay – or, if negative, to accept – to live in city j relative to a city
with an average QOL. Equation (4b) measures the productivity differential, Aˆj,
from how high the labour costs, θNwˆj, and land costs, θLrˆj, are in traded-good
production. It measures the percentage cost-savings that firms experience from
locating in city j relative to the national average. Equation (4c) constrains the
local-good price differential, pˆj, to equal the labour-cost differential, φNwˆj, plus
the land-cost differential, φLrˆj. It is safe to assume that local goods are more
land intensive and less labour intensive than traded goods, so that φL > θL and
θN > φN .
In practice, wage and local-goodprice differentials are observable, and soQOL
differentials are measurable directly from (4a). Land-rents are generally unob-
served, making it difficult to measure productivity directly from (4b). However,
by assuming that local-good productivity is the same across cities, it is possible to
infer both land-rent and productivity differentials using only data on local-good
costs and wages by rearranging equation (4c) and then substituting into (4b):
rˆj = 1
φL
(
pˆj − φNwˆj
)
(5)
Aˆj = θL
φL
pˆj +
(
θN − φN θL
φL
)
wˆj. (6)
Land rents are inferred in (5) by subtracting off the labour costs φNwˆj from pˆj –
which in the case of housing could be interpretable as construction costs – and
dividing the remainder by the cost share of land, φL. The productivity measure
in (6) is based on nominal wage levels through θNwˆj plus the cost share due to
land, inferred through local-good prices. The coefficient θL/φL > 1 reflects how
much more local-good prices must be weighted when they are used to proxy for
land values, while the negative term in parentheses removes the double-counting
of labour costs in pˆ.
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The total value of amenity-differences for city j is equal to theQOLdifferential
plus the productivity differential times its share of expenditure
ˆj = Qˆj + sxAˆj (7)
= sR
φL
pˆj +
(
τ ′sw − sRφN
φL
)
wˆj − dT
j
m
.
The second equality, expressed in terms of observable variables, results from
substituting in (4a) and (4b). Collecting terms, using (5) and simplifying, we
obtain that the total amenity differential expresses the social value of land. This
is equal to the differential value of private land rents, measured as a percentage
of income, plus the fiscal externalities in terms of additional federal taxes paid
net of federal transfers received.
ˆj = sRrˆj + τ ′swwˆj − dTj/m. (8)
It is worth noting that if tradable goods are heterogeneous, a higher level
of demand for goods produced disproportionately in city j may be conflated
with a higher level of productivity. For instance, if the world price for oil is
particularly high, and workers in Calgary are concentrated in the oil industry,
then the marginal revenue product of workers in Calgary may be relatively high,
even if their marginal physical product is not. Thus, Aˆj may be interpreted to
capture a combination of both real and pecuniary effects.
Furthermore, cities could also vary in their productivity of local goods. As
discussed in Albouy (2009b), productivity in local goods cannot be identified
without extensive data on land values, which are currently unavailable in Canada.
Under our other assumptions, lack of such identification does not affect our
measures of quality of life, Qˆj; the lack does cause our measures of tradable-
good productivity, Aˆj, to be slightly underestimated in cities where local-good
productivity is high. Inferred land values both private, rˆ, and social, ˆj, are more
severely underestimated in such cities, but these are peripheral to our analysis.8
2.2.2. Multiple household types and aggregation
With multiple types, the log-linearized version of the mobility condition (1) is
Qˆjg = sygpˆjg − swg(1 − τ ′g)wˆjg − dTj/mg (9)
for each group g. Note that this requires each group’s price and wage differen-
tials, pˆjg and wˆ
j
g, but also each group’s specific marginal tax rate, τ ′g, expenditure
8 Higher productivity in non-tradables tends to lower wages and prices by a relatively small
amount, and in the same proportion that trade productivity raises them. More generally, the
measure of productivity we use strongly reflects higher levels of tradable productivity and, more
weakly, lower levels of non-tradable productivity.
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share syg, and income share swg. It is possible to define an aggregate quality-of-
life index Qˆj ≡ μj·Qˆj that is consistent with the single-type index in (4a) if we
define the aggregate local-good price differential as pˆj ≡ (1/sy)
∑
g μ
j
gsygpˆ
j
g, and
the aggregate wage differential as wˆj ≡ (1/sw)
∑
g μ
j
gswgwˆ
j
g, and assume that all
groups face the same marginal tax rate τ ′.
With multiple labour types, the zero-profit condition for tradable-good-
producing firms is Aˆj = θN · wˆj + θLrˆj, where Aˆj ≡ θN · AˆjN + θLAˆjL + θKAˆjK ,
which estimates productivity using the labour-cost measure with θ jN · wˆj. A po-
tential problem with this approximation is that the local cost shares, θ jN, may
vary considerably from the national ones, θN . But, when each group g’s fraction
of total labour costs in city j, θ jNg/θN, is proportional to its share of total labour
income in city j, that is,
θ
j
Ng
θN
= μjg
swg
sw
for all g, (10)
the single wage measure proposed above, wˆj, reflects labour costs with local cost
shares, θ jN , so that θNwˆ
j = θ jN · wˆj. Thus, estimates from equation (4b) still mea-
sure overall productivity, as before, although they reflect the factors in proportion
to how they are used locally, rather than nationally.
In the online technical appendix A.1, we show that, using this same as-
sumption, it is possible to estimate the land-rent differential using equation
(6) from aggregate wage and housing-cost differences, using the approxima-
tions φL = (sR − sxθL)/sy and φN = (sw − sxθN)/sy. Thus, we can have a feasible
estimate of productivity from (6) above that estimates the marginal productiv-
ity of land through residential housing. Furthermore, if federal marginal tax
rates for groups are the same, then the total value of amenities is still given
by (7).
As households are perfectly mobile and each type has homogeneous tastes,
we should expect households to sort across CMAs according to their tastes for
local amenities. The centrifugal forces of household preferences may be coun-
tered by centripetal forces in production, if different labour types are imperfectly
substitutable. In fact, when labour types are imperfect substitutes, the relative
productivity of individual types is not inferrable from wage and price informa-
tion alone. Such inference also requires information on relative factor usage in
the traded sector. Using the labour-demand equations for the traded sector, it is
possible to show that the relative demand for labour depends on relative wages
and relative productivity levels:
Nˆj1X − Nˆj2X = −σ12
(
wˆ
j
1 − wˆj2
)+ (σ12 − 1) (Aˆj1 − Aˆj2), (11)
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where σ12 is the elasticity of substitution between type-1 and type-2 labour.9
Intuitively, this (along with fixed land supplies) produces downward-sloping
demand for particular labour types. For instance, one can imagine that producers
of tradable output in Montreal could find having a few native English speakers
to be very productive for helping to export its products. However, because of
provincial laws requiring the use of French in the workplace, these workers would
be less productive than comparable native French speakers if they were employed
in equal proportion. Similarly, allophonesmay have some idiosyncratic skills that
are imperfect substitutes for those possessed by other language groups, much as
Ottaviano and Peri (2012) found for immigrants relative to natives in the United
States.
As derived in the online technical appendix A.1.2, equation (11) implies that
the productivity of type 2 workers is (with a symmetric expression for type 1) is
Aˆj2 =
θ
j
N1
θ
j
N1 + θ jN2
Nˆj2X − Nˆj1X + σ12
(
wˆ
j
2 − wˆj1
)
σ12 − 1 + Aˆ
j. (12)
This formula implies that the greater the elasticity of substitution between the
two labour types, themore important wage differences are relative to employment
differences in reflecting productivity differences. When labour types are strong
substitutes, wages must offset the productivity differences of different types: as
σ12 → ∞, Aˆj2 = (wˆj2 − wˆj1)θ jN1/(θ jN1 + θ jN2) + Aˆj, which in the case where N1 and
N2 are the only two factors is just Aˆ2 = wˆ2. But when substitution possibilities
aremore limited, firms are less able to bid up the relative wage ofmore productive
labour, and relative factor usage becomes more informative.
3. Empirical implementation
To apply our model to Canada, we estimate city-specific wage and price differen-
tials using Census micro-data for the reference year 2005 and calibrate the cost,
income, expenditure, and tax parameters from other sources.10
3.1. Data and the estimation of wage and housing-cost differentials
We estimate wage and housing-cost differentials using the 2006 20% Cana-
dian Census Microdata Masterfile. Most of the differentials apply to a Census
Metropolitan Area (CMA), which consist of municipalities located around an
urban core with a population of at least 100,000. The remaining differentials are
9 This equation is often seen in the analysis of skill-biased technical change (e.g., Violante 2008).
10 The reference year for the earnings is the 2005 calendar year. For housing costs, it is the monthly
average over the past 12 months with the reference day of interview being 16 May 2006. For
renters, it is the current monthly rent paid.
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for non-CMA areas grouped by province. In total, there are 33 CMAs and 13
non-CMA areas.
3.1.1. Wage differentials and union adjustments
The inter-urban wage differentials come from a sample of full-time workers,
ages 25 to 55, and control for observable skill differences across workers. Thus,
for each language group, determined by the mother tongue of the worker, we
regress log wages on CMA-indicators (ν jw) and on extensive controls (Xiw) in the
equation lnwij = Xiwβw + ν jw + εijw.11 The estimated values of ν jw, normalized to
have a population-weighted average of zero, are our estimates of the log-wage
differentials, wˆjg. We interpret them as the causal effect of city characteristics on
a worker’s wage. Identifying these differentials requires that workers do not sort
across cities according to their unobserved skills.12 The overall differential for
each city, wˆj, is equal to the average of the wˆjg for each language group, weighted
by the number of workers in each city.13
When controlling for location and additional controls, allophones earn wages
16% lower than anglophones while francophones earn 2% less.14 These differ-
ences within CMAs could be due to a variety of reasons, such as school quality
or linguistic discrimination (Albouy 2008b).
As we document in appendix table A3, union coverage rates in Canada are
high and differ substantially across CMAs, with coverage rates varying from
23% in Calgary to almost 50% in Quebec, Sherbrooke, and Thunder Bay. To the
extent that wages reflect marginal productivity and unions raise them beyond
this competitive rate, it is appropriate to adjust them in order to estimate pro-
ductivity levels. It is theoretically ambiguous whether union wage premia should
be discounted when estimating QOL. If union jobs are readily accessible to new
migrants, and these higher premia are reflected in higher rents and other costs of
11 We include a quartic in potential work experience, highest level education (12 indicators), field
of study (17 indicators), occupation (24 indicators), industry (15 indicators), immigrant status
interacted with the visible minority status (except for Aboriginal status), years since
immigration, citizenship status, and bilingualism interacted with mother tongue. All these
variables are fully interacted with gender. The online technical appendix B provides greater
detail on the covariates and regressions. The estimates of the coefficients of the controls are also
available in the online technical appendix.
12 This assumption may not hold completely. Glaeser and Mare´ (2001) argue that up to one-third
of the urban-rural wage gap could be due to selection, suggesting that at least two-thirds of
wage differentials are valid, although this issue deserves greater investigation. At the same time,
it is possible that the estimates could be too small, as some control variables, such as occupation
or industry, could depend on where the worker locates.
13 Note that in practice, some workers live and work in different CMAs. We determine the CMA of
a worker by their place of work, so that our productivity estimates are clearly characteristic of
the city. The QOL estimates should on the whole be more accurate, since they will represent the
wages and costs faced by workers with relatively modest commutes. Regardless, the results are
almost identical if we assign wage differentials by place of residence, rather than place of work.
14 Although these differentials control for the official languages the worker speaks, the Census
does not indicate how proficient respondents are in their languages. It seems likely that
self-reported bilingual anglophones speak English better than self-reported bilingual
francophones do, and vice versa.
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living, then it would be inappropriate to discount the premia. If instead, union
wage premia are not capitalized into higher land rents and local costs of living,
then it is sensible to discount them. Otherwise, real incomes in highly union-
ized areas may be high relative to the local QOL, and QOL estimates in highly
unionized areas will be biased downwards.
Unfortunately, theCensus data do not contain information on union coverage.
We were able to calculate CMA-level unionization rates from the Labour Force
Survey, although these rates are not available by mother tongue. We eliminate in-
ferred union-wage premia by multiplying the union coverage rates by a premium
of 7.7 log points, taken from Fang and Verma (2002), and subtracting them from
the original estimates of wˆj, renormalizing them to have a population-weighted
average value of zero.
The importance of the public sector varies greatly by cities. For example, a little
less than 40% of workers are employed in the public sector in Ottawa compared
with less than 15% in Toronto. Like unionization, this potentially has an impact
on wages. To control for this, we account for the percentage of the workforce in
each CMA that works in a public sector job.15
3.1.2. Housing-cost differentials
Following previous studies (e.g., Gabriel and Rosenthal 2004), we use both hous-
ing values and gross rents, including utilities, to calculate housing-cost differen-
tials. For owned units, we multiply housing values times a discount rate of 7.85%
(Peiser and Smith 1985), and add utility costs, to impute rents comparable to
gross rents. We regress the logarithm of these rents on flexible controls (Xiw) in
the equation ln pij = Xipβp + ν jp + εijp.16 The coefficients ν jp, normalized to have a
population-weighted average of zero, are our estimates of the housing-cost differ-
entials, pˆj. Proper identification of housing-cost differences requires that average
unobserved housing quality, and the extent of foreign investment, do not vary
systematically across cities.17
15 We also imposed the restriction that βw is constant across cities. In analyses that we do not
report, we did find evidence that there are some differences in the returns to characteristics
across cities. For instance, university-educated workers receive less of a premium for working in
Vancouver than high-school-educated workers. This suggests that the former enjoy a higher
quality of life in Vancouver. While interesting, most of these return differences are relatively
minor and, for the sake of simplicity, are left for future work.
16 The controls, which are interacted with renter-status, include number of rooms (9 indicators),
number of bedrooms (5 indicators), number of rooms interacted with number of bedrooms,
number of rooms per household member, type of building (7 indicators), age of building (9
indicators), and state of repair (2 indicators). For owner-occupied units, we include an indicator
for condominium status and interact the controls with mortgage status. See the online technical
appendix B for more detail. The estimates of the coefficients of the controls are available in the
online technical appendix.
17 Unobserved housing quality differences should be minor, as Malpezzi et. al. (1998) determine
that housing-cost indices derived from the U.S. Census in this way perform as well or better
than most other indices. As well, in the admittedly limited data available, foreign investments in
major Canadian housing markets appear to be small. For instance, Tal (2011) uses Landcor
data, a comprehensive database on historical sales and current information on the BC
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Controlling for CMA and additional controls, we find that allophones have
housing costs that are almost identical to those of anglophones, while fran-
cophones have housing costs that are around 13% lower. The lower housing
costs of francophones potentially reflect the fact that anglophones may live in
more amenable areas within CMAs, such as Montreal, where historic anglo-
phone neighbourhoods are generally considered very amenable. It could also be
that anglophones face a more restricted housing market or enjoy better housing
quality, which we cannot control for.
3.2. Calibration
The calibrated values for the parameters are similar to those for theUnited States
found in Albouy (2009b), except that we amend them for Canada to account
for a smaller share of income received by labour, and a smaller proportion of
expenditures spent on locally produced goods.
sx = 0.67 θL = 0.025 φL = 0.25 sR = 0.10
sy = 0.33 θN = 0.775 φN = 0.55 sw = 0.70
θK = 0.20 φK = 0.20 sI = 0.20.
Information on income and expenditure share differences by language group is
lacking, and so we assume they are the same, which allows us to use equation
(10) for our estimates.
The elasticity of substitution between different labour types is unknown. Otta-
viano and Peri (2012) estimate the elasticity of substitution between immigrants
and non-immigrant workers to be about 20. It would seem that the elasticity of
substitution between workers of different language groups is much higher than
this elasticity, given that the workers were often born and raised in Canada and
thus have even more similar skills.18 Thus, we use two potential values for σ : ∞
and 40, where the latter illustrates the case of imperfect substitutability.
Although federal tax differences are included in the analysis, federal transfer
and spending differences are not. These are discussed in section 6.1.
Calculated tax differentials depend on both federal and provincial tax rates.
They include direct taxes on income as well as indirect taxes on consumption;
since this is a static model without an intertemporal savings decision, the two
are equivalent as taxes on consumption reduce the buying power of labour. We
determine provincial differentials using wage differences within province only.
Across provinces, the average marginal tax rate on labour income is 28%. See the
online technical appendix for more details.19
residential and commercial markets, to document that only 2.6% of all sales over the past five
years can be accounted by owners whose tax notice is sent to addresses outside Canada.
18 We include immigrant controls to capture differences in immigrant/Canadian born earning
outcomes. See the online technical appendix for more detail.
19 Many workers report receiving little income other than labour income. However, given the static
nature of the model, a worker’s choices should be modelled to account for a worker’s permanent
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4. Quality of life and productivity estimates
4.1. Main estimates
Columns 2 and 3 of table 1 report the estimated wage and housing-cost dif-
ferentials by CMA or non-CMA areas of provinces. Figure 1 graphs these and
provides intuition for how we use them to infer overall QOL and productivity
differentials, reported in columns 4 and 5. The figure displays the average mo-
bility condition from (4a), with Qˆj = 0, and the combined average zero-profit
conditions from (6), with Aˆj = 0. The average mobility condition illustrates the
housing costs households are willing to pay for a given wage; any premium above
that housing cost level is inferred to be payment for consumption amenities, and
thus the vertical distance above that condition indicates overall QOL, Qˆj. The
combined zero-profit condition illustrates the rate at which land rents, inferred
through housing costs, must fall, on average, as wages rise. Any premium over
this is inferred to be payment for production amenities, and thus the vertical (or
horizontal) distance from that condition indicates overall firm productivity in the
traded sector, Aˆj. Through a change in the coordinate system, the two conditions
in figure 1 provide a set of axes for the new coordinate system in figure 2, which
is in the space of productivity and QOL.
Interestingly, Canada’s five largest CMAs – Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver,
Ottawa-Hull, and Calgary – all have above-average productivity and QOL, as
they lie above the average mobility-condition and to the right of the average
zero-profit condition. The smaller cities of Halifax and Kelowna have above-
average QOL but much lower productivity, which is commensurate with their
reputations as charming tourist destinations. Kitchener, Oshawa, and Windsor
have less-than-average QOL, but are quite productive given their size, although
this is likely to do with their proximity to Toronto and Detroit. Also in this
category are the Territories, where high wages simultaneously reflect the high
marginal productivity of the workers there, as well as the need for those workers
to be compensated for the harsh climate and remote location. Finally, a large
number of smaller cities, including Moncton, Regina, St. John’s, Thunder Bay,
and Trois-Rivie`res fall in the category of cities with below-average productivity
and QOL, with the compensating benefit of being affordable. All of the non-
CMA areas of provinces (except for those in BC) also fall in this category,
suggesting that on average neither firms nor households find less urban areas to
be exceptionally attractive.
The rankings of the cities in terms of overall QOL, productivity, and their
combined value are given in table 2. Victoria has the highest QOL, followed by
Vancouver, Kelowna, Abbotsford, and Toronto. Rounding out the top ten are
Calgary, Montreal, Sherbrooke, Ottawa-Hull, and Barrie. Saint John, Windsor,
and Thunder Bay take the bottom three spots. This list contrasts significantly
income, which includes a large non-labour component, particularly if implicit rental earnings
from one’s own home are included.
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TABLE 1
Prices, attributes, and values across Canadian cities
Value
Observed prices Attribute capitalization
Housing Quality Product- Land Tax Total
City/area Population Wages costs of life ivity rent burden value
name (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Census Metropolitan Areas
Vancouver 2,047,650 0.04 0.45 0.13 0.07 1.71 0.01 0.18
Victoria 320,920 −0.04 0.46 0.17 0.02 1.92 −0.01 0.18
Toronto 4,966,660 0.10 0.29 0.05 0.10 0.93 0.02 0.11
Calgary 1,053,840 0.09 0.24 0.04 0.09 0.78 0.02 0.10
Kelowna 159,490 −0.07 0.24 0.11 −0.03 1.09 −0.02 0.09
Montreal 3,534,850 0.02 0.14 0.04 0.03 0.51 0.01 0.06
Ottawa-Hull 1,106,380 0.08 0.13 0.01 0.07 0.37 0.02 0.06
Abbotsford 154,830 −0.03 0.12 0.06 −0.01 0.55 −0.01 0.05
Guelph 125,070 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.13 0.01 0.02
Hamilton 676,780 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.14 0.01 0.02
Oshawa 326,890 0.11 0.02 −0.04 0.08 −0.16 0.03 0.01
Edmonton 1,013,400 0.03 −0.01 −0.02 0.02 −0.11 0.00 −0.01
Kitchener 441,420 0.05 −0.02 −0.03 0.03 −0.18 0.01 −0.01
Quebec 701,420 −0.02 −0.02 0.00 −0.02 −0.03 −0.01 −0.01
Barrie 174,420 −0.04 −0.03 0.01 −0.03 −0.02 −0.01 −0.02
Kingston 147,230 −0.05 −0.05 0.00 −0.04 −0.08 −0.01 −0.02
Peterborough 114,580 −0.06 −0.05 0.00 −0.05 −0.09 −0.02 −0.03
Sherbrooke 182,330 −0.09 −0.06 0.02 −0.07 −0.04 −0.02 −0.03
St. Catharines-
Niagara
381,170 −0.02 −0.12 −0.04 −0.02 −0.45 −0.01 −0.05
Brantford 122,420 −0.03 −0.13 −0.03 −0.03 −0.46 −0.01 −0.05
Halifax 366,790 −0.11 −0.16 0.01 −0.09 −0.39 −0.02 −0.06
London 447,310 0.01 −0.15 −0.06 −0.01 −0.64 0.00 −0.06
Windsor 316,170 0.10 −0.21 −0.11 0.05 −1.06 0.03 −0.08
Sudbury 155,990 0.03 −0.23 −0.09 0.00 −0.97 0.01 −0.09
Trois-Rivie`res 138,160 −0.01 −0.26 −0.08 −0.03 −1.01 −0.00 −0.10
Chicoutimi-
Jonquie`re
149,440 0.01 −0.28 −0.10 −0.02 −1.16 0.01 −0.11
Winnipeg 677,500 −0.08 −0.29 −0.05 −0.09 −0.99 −0.01 −0.11
Saskatoon 228,080 −0.10 −0.30 −0.05 −0.10 −0.98 −0.02 −0.12
Regina 190,790 −0.04 −0.34 −0.09 −0.06 −1.27 −0.00 −0.13
Moncton 123,580 −0.13 −0.35 −0.05 −0.13 −1.13 −0.02 −0.14
Thunder Bay 120,720 −0.01 −0.39 −0.13 −0.04 −1.54 0.00 −0.15
St. John’s 178,170 −0.12 −0.44 −0.09 −0.13 −1.50 −0.02 −0.17
Saint John 119,800 −0.11 −0.49 −0.11 −0.13 −1.74 −0.01 −0.19
Non-CMA Areas
British
Columbia
1,327,040 −0.05 −0.05 0.01 −0.04 −0.09 −0.01 −0.02
Northwest
Territories
40,770 0.19 −0.06 −0.12 0.13 −0.66 0.04 −0.03
Yukon 29,960 0.04 −0.12 −0.06 0.02 −0.55 0.01 −0.05
Alberta 1,153,770 −0.03 −0.16 −0.04 −0.04 −0.58 −0.01 −0.07
Ontario 2,530,520 −0.05 −0.20 −0.05 −0.06 −0.69 −0.01 −0.08
Quebec 2,386,520 −0.08 −0.30 −0.06 −0.09 −1.01 −0.02 −0.12
Prince Edward
Island
133,830 −0.24 −0.48 −0.04 −0.22 −1.37 −0.05 −0.19
(Continued)
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TABLE 1
(Continued)
Value
Observed prices Attribute capitalization
Housing Quality Product- Land Tax Total
City/area Population Wages costs of life ivity rent burden value
name (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Nunavut 29,270 0.25 −0.55 −0.31 0.13 −2.75 0.05 −0.22
New
Brunswick
473,080 −0.18 −0.59 −0.11 −0.19 −1.95 −0.04 −0.23
Nova Scotia 532,270 −0.23 −0.60 −0.09 −0.22 −1.88 −0.05 −0.24
Manitoba 445,220 −0.19 −0.63 −0.12 −0.20 −2.09 −0.04 −0.25
Saskatchewan 529,430 −0.20 −0.75 −0.15 −0.22 −2.55 −0.04 −0.30
Newfoundland 320,930 −0.18 −0.95 −0.23 −0.22 −3.40 −0.03 −0.37
Standard deviations across areas
Canada 30,896,860 0.09 0.30 0.07 0.06 0.71 0.02 0.08
NOTES: Wage and housing cost data are taken from the Census 2006Masterfiles. Wage differentials
are based on the average logarithm of hourly wages for full-time workers ages 25 to 55, controlling
for observable skills. Housing cost differentials are based on the average logarithm of rents and
housing price, controlling for observable housing characteristics. Quality of life, productivity, land
rent, tax burden, and total value differentials are based on formulas explained in section 2.2.1
in the text for the one-household-type case. Fuller details on the data are in the online technical
appendix.
with that of Giannias (1998), who places Edmonton and Winnipeg in the top 4
of 13 cities, which here are ranked 17 and 24 out of 33.
From the second column of table 2, we see that Toronto is the leader in
productivity, which is not surprising, given that it is the largest city and home
of the financial centre of Canada. Second is Calgary, only the fifth-largest CMA
at that time, but with a strong oil and gas industry. Third is Oshawa, as it is
50 kilometres from Toronto, with a strong base in automobile manufacturing.
Vancouver and Ottawa-Hull round out the top five. All of these cities pay a
disproportionate share of federal taxes per capita, as seen in column 7 of table
1, as a result of being so productive. Despite being the second-largest CMA in
Canada, Montreal is only in tenth place, possibly because of its language barrier
with the rest of Canada and the United States.
The land-rent and total-value differentials are reported in columns 6 and 8
of table 1, with their difference caused by the tax differentials in column 7, and
the ranking reported in column 3 of table 2. Their calculation is made visually
transparent in figures 1 and 2 through the average iso-rent and iso-value curves;
cities above these lines have above-average rents and total values, respectively.
From these we see that Victoria has the highest private value of land, although
Vancouver has the highest social value, as its higher wage levels lead to greater
positive tax externalities for other Canadians.
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FIGURE 1 Housing costs versus wage levels across CMAs
4.2. Estimates for separate language groups
QOLmeasures broken down bymother tongue are presented in table 3 for CMAs
with at least 100,000 inhabitants with that mother tongue, and where they con-
stitute at least 10% of the population. Calculating QOLmeasures for cities where
a smaller number of individuals have a certain mother tongue raises difficult
econometric issues.20 On the whole, the QOL rankings for the different language
20 In places where a linguistic group is a small minority, the calculated wage differentials tend to
be relatively low and the housing-cost differentials between language groups relatively high. See
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FIGURE 2 Estimated productivity and quality of life
groups are almost identical to those pooling everyone together. For instance,
all of the groups prefer Montreal over Ottawa-Hull. The only discrepancy is
minor: unlike anglophones, allophones appear to view Hamilton slightly more
favourably than Ottawa-Hull, perhaps because they make up a larger fraction of
the population.Francophones donot seemaverse to living in linguistically diverse
CMAs, asMontreal and Ottawa-Hull are their top two cities, while the worst two
Warman (2007) for Canadian analysis and evidence of enclaves. It is likely that these individuals
have idiosyncratic attachments, such as spouses, that cause them to sacrifice real income in
order to live in these places.
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TABLE 2
Census metropolitan area rankings
Quality of life ranking Productivity ranking Total value ranking
1 Victoria Toronto Vancouver
2 Vancouver Calgary Victoria
3 Kelowna Oshawa Toronto
4 Abbotsford Vancouver Calgary
5 Toronto Ottawa-Hull Kelowna
6 Calgary Windsor Montreal
7 Montreal Guelph Ottawa-Hull
8 Sherbrooke Kitchener Abbotsford
9 Ottawa-Hull Hamilton Guelph
10 Barrie Montreal Hamilton
11 Halifax Edmonton Oshawa
12 Peterborough Victoria Edmonton
13 Quebec Sudbury Kitchener
14 Kingston London Quebec
15 Hamilton Abbotsford Barrie
16 Guelph Quebec Kingston
17 Edmonton Chicoutimi-Jonquie`re Peterborough
18 Kitchener St. Catharines-Niagara Sherbrooke
19 Brantford Kelowna St. Catharines-Niagara
20 St. Catharines-Niagara Brantford Brantford
21 Oshawa Barrie Halifax
22 Saskatoon Trois-Rivie`res London
23 Moncton Kingston Windsor
24 Winnipeg Thunder Bay Sudbury
25 London Peterborough Trois-Rivie`res
26 Trois-Rivie`res Regina Chicoutimi-Jonquie`re
27 St. John’s Sherbrooke Winnipeg
28 Regina Winnipeg Saskatoon
29 Sudbury Halifax Regina
30 Chicoutimi-Jonquie`re Saskatoon Moncton
31 Saint John Saint John Thunder Bay
32 Windsor Moncton St. John’s
33 Thunder Bay St. John’s Saint John
NOTES: Rankings are based on data in table 1.
are Trois-Rivie`res and Chicoutimi-Jonquie`re. Allophones prefer Canada’s three
largest cities, Vancouver, Toronto, andMontreal, over all other ones, supporting
the notion that allophones will prefer to live in areas with the greatest number of
like-tongued speakers.
The individual productivity of different language groups is given in table 4
for just a few cities where the supply of each group is large enough to produce
credible estimates. Panel A considers the productivity differences between
francophones and anglophones in Montreal and Ottawa-Hull. In Montreal,
average productivity is 3% above the national average, and francophones are
better paid and much more heavily employed than anglophones. If both types
of workers are perfect substitutes, then francophones from Montreal are 4%
more productive than the average francophone, while anglophones are 4% less
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TABLE 3
Wage, housing-cost, and quality of life differentials by mother tongue
Population Fraction Housing Quality
Rank Name of group of total Wages cost of life
Panel A: Anglophones
1 Victoria 275,930 0.86 − 0.04 0.48 0.18
2 Vancouver 1,215,480 0.59 0.06 0.52 0.14
3 Kelowna 136,450 0.86 − 0.07 0.25 0.11
4 Abbotsford 111,720 0.72 − 0.04 0.17 0.07
5 Toronto 2,823,580 0.57 0.14 0.38 0.06
6 Montreal 448,710 0.13 − 0.02 0.12 0.05
7 Calgary 805,620 0.76 0.10 0.28 0.05
8 Ottawa-Hull 561,760 0.51 0.07 0.14 0.01
9 Guelph 101,260 0.81 0.02 0.08 0.01
10 Hamilton 521,760 0.77 0.04 0.09 0.01
11 Barrie 155,420 0.89 − 0.04 − 0.02 0.01
12 Kingston 130,340 0.89 − 0.05 − 0.04 0.01
13 Peterborough 106,690 0.93 − 0.06 − 0.05 0.00
14 Halifax 338,550 0.92 − 0.11 − 0.17 0.00
15 Edmonton 795,610 0.79 0.03 0.02 − 0.01
16 Kitchener 337,780 0.77 0.05 0.02 − 0.02
17 Brantford 108,240 0.88 − 0.03 − 0.12 − 0.03
18 St. Catharines-Niagara 309,680 0.81 − 0.02 − 0.11 − 0.03
19 Oshawa 285,270 0.87 0.12 0.03 − 0.04
20 Winnipeg 515,180 0.76 − 0.08 − 0.27 − 0.05
21 Saskatoon 198,190 0.87 − 0.10 − 0.29 − 0.05
22 London 366,120 0.82 0.01 − 0.13 − 0.05
23 Regina 170,940 0.90 − 0.04 − 0.33 − 0.08
24 St. John’s 174,350 0.98 − 0.12 − 0.44 − 0.09
25 Sudbury 101,230 0.65 0.00 − 0.31 − 0.10
26 Windsor 234,100 0.74 0.09 − 0.19 − 0.10
27 Saint John 111,370 0.93 − 0.12 − 0.51 − 0.11
28 Thunder Bay 101,930 0.84 − 0.01 − 0.38 − 0.12
Panel B: Francophones
1 Montreal 2,359,840 0.67 0.06 0.21 0.05
2 Ottawa-Hull 366,230 0.33 0.10 0.21 0.03
3 Sherbrooke 165,740 0.91 − 0.08 − 0.03 0.02
4 Quebec 672,750 0.96 − 0.02 − 0.01 0.01
5 Trois-Rivie`res 134,530 0.97 − 0.01 − 0.25 − 0.08
6 Chicoutimi-Jonquie`re 146,680 0.98 0.01 − 0.28 − 0.09
Panel C: Allophones
1 Vancouver 806,880 0.39 0.00 0.32 0.11
2 Toronto 2,080,620 0.42 0.04 0.15 0.03
3 Montreal 726,300 0.21 − 0.10 − 0.13 0.01
4 Calgary 231,480 0.22 0.06 0.06 − 0.01
5 Hamilton 144,830 0.21 0.01 − 0.12 − 0.05
6 Ottawa-Hull 178,380 0.16 0.05 − 0.09 − 0.05
7 Edmonton 195,240 0.19 0.01 − 0.18 − 0.07
8 Winnipeg 132,890 0.20 − 0.12 − 0.49 − 0.10
NOTES: Wage and housing-cost differentials are calculated by language group according to the
component orthogonal to observable characteristics but related to the CMA indicators interacted
with language-group indicators.
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TABLE 4
Relative productivity of specific mother tongues in selected cities
Panel A: Francophones relative to anglophones Mother-tongue-specific productivity
σ = ∞ σ = 40
Total Franco- Anglo- Franco- Anglo-
CMA Wages Employment prod phone phone phone phone
Relative log ratio
Montreal 0.076 2.802 0.027 0.037 −0.039 0.047 −0.103
Ottawa-Hull 0.029 0.560 0.069 0.085 0.057 0.094 0.051
Panel B: Allophones relative to anglophones
σ = ∞ σ = 40
Total Allo- Anglo- Allo- Anglo-
CMA Wages Employment prod phone phone phone phone
Relative log ratio
Toronto −0.096 0.878 0.100 0.046 0.142 0.058 0.133
Vancouver −0.062 0.643 0.072 0.034 0.095 0.043 0.090
NOTES: Wage and employment ratios are expressed in logarithms relative to the national log ratio
(i.e., subtracting the national log ratio). Productivity levels are relative to others in the same language
group and are calculated based on equation (12) in the text.
productive, making them about as productive as anglophones in Kingston.
If anglophones provide special skills that cannot be easily substituted for by
francophone labour, then the productivity differences are even larger: with an
elasticity of substitution of 40, an anglophone worker in Montreal is only 10%
less productive, comparable anglophones in Saskatoon, and wages are as high as
they are only because francophones cannot easily replace them. The results for
Ottawa-Hull are much less extreme, since their national wage and employment
differentials are roughly the same.
Panel B considers the productivity differences between anglophones and al-
lophones in Toronto and Vancouver. In both CMAs, allophones earn less of a
premium than anglophones do, but are hired in a greater proportion, relative
to the national average. Thus, the less substitutable allophone labour is for an-
glophone labour, the closer their relative productivity differentials. It appears
that anglophones in Vancouver have productivity levels just behind Calgary and
ahead of Oshawa.
5. Relationship with popular rankings and amenities
The press abounds with popular rankings of Canadian cities according to many
characteristics aimed at capturing ‘livability.’ Here, we compare our rankings
based on revealed preference with the livability ratings from Places Rated Al-
manac and Cities Ranked and Rated. The popular measures are not grounded in
theory and are largely ad hoc; they reflect popular perceptions of what charac-
teristics make cities ‘nice’ to live in. Unlike the rankings based on willingness-
to-pay, the popular rankings also incorporate low cost-of-living and good job-
market opportunities as ‘amenities.’ In the hedonic framework above, if these
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TABLE 5
Correlation of economic quality of life and popular rankings
Places Rated Cities Ranked
Almanac & Rated
(1) (2)
Hedonic QOL rank 0.71 0.72
Places Rated Almanac 0.84
factors are properly weighted, they should make all of the cities offer the same
utility, making them equally ‘livable.’ In practice, the popular rankings put
less weight on cost-of-living and job-market opportunities than the framework
suggests.21
Table 5 reports the correlation coefficients between the popular rankings
and the overall QOL ranking shown in table 1. All the correlations are strongly
positive, the correlation between the two popular rankings being somewhat
stronger than that between either popular ranking and the economic one.
These correlations are strong despite the fact that the popular rankings include
offsetting cost-of-living and job-market opportunities. The general consistency
of the rankings seems to be mutually reinforcing to both the economic and the
popular measures of QOL.
Table 6 estimates the relationship between the economic QOL estimates and
ratings given to cities by Places Rated Almanac along various dimensions. The
overall livability index in the Almanac puts equal weight on all of the estimates.
Hedonic estimates based on the economicmeasures ofQOL indicate that only the
indices for climate and arts and culture have a significant relationship with house-
holds’ willingness-to-pay. This holds true whether or not CMAs are weighted by
population. With only 24 overlapping CMAs in the sample, this test does have
low power; indeed, factors related to health, crime, and education may be very
important in households’ location decisions. But it appears unlikely that Places
Rated was correct to assign each sub-index the same coefficient; our economic
QOL index suggests that the restriction that all of the subindices should have
equal coefficients is strongly rejected by the data. Understandably, Canadians
care tremendously about climate. They also appear to care considerably about
arts and culture or other amenities that are correlated with that index, not ac-
counted for by the other indices.
6. Additional considerations
The model presented above has the advantage of requiring limited data, and of
being intuitive to graph. Yet additional considerations should be examined, in
particular with regard to non-housing costs, federal fiscal transfers, and housing
21 For instance, in Places Rated, cost-of-living and employment opportunities, are counted as two
among nine amenities, all of which receive equal weight.
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TABLE 6
Quality of life, productivity, and disaggregated amenities from Places Rated Almanac
Quality of life Quality of life
(unweighted) (pop weight)
(1) (2)
Arts & Culture 0.08 0.13
(0.04) (0.05)
Climate 0.20 0.16
(0.06) (0.05)
Crime 0.05 0.04
(0.06) (0.05)
Education 0.07 0.06
(0.07) (0.08)
Recreation − 0.01 − 0.03
(0.07) (0.05)
Health 0.07 0.08
(0.07) (0.06)
Transportation − 0.04 0.00
(0.07) (0.07)
Constant − 0.21 − 0.24
(0.06) (0.06)
Adjusted R-squared 0.59 0.63
Number of observations 24 24
p-value of test that all coefficients are equal 0.01 0.01
NOTES: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Regressions in the second column are weighted
by the sum of individuals in each CMA.
rents.Webelieve it is unclearwhether these considerations should be incorporated
into the QOL and productivity estimates. Furthermore, much of the data are
available only at the provincial level. Adjusted figures are presented separately
in the appendix. The results are also summarized at the provincial and regional
levels in table 7.22
6.1. Intergovernmental transfers
We adjust for intergovernmental transfers and provincial source-based tax rev-
enues in column 9. If these payments benefit households, they should be sub-
tracted from QOL; if they benefit firms, they should be subtracted from produc-
tivity; in either case they should be subtracted from the total value. On the other
hand, if these payments benefit neither households nor firms then they should
be ignored altogether. Assuming that the payments do affect the total value in
some form, they raise the value ofOntario andQuebec, while theAtlantic and the
Prairie provinces are seen as less valuable. As analyzed in greater detail in Albouy
(2012), this is mainly driven by equalization payments, except for Alberta and
Saskatchewan, which receive large fiscal benefits by retaining provincial revenues
from taxes on natural resources, rather than sharing them federally.
22 CMA-level adjustments for QOL and total value, assuming that federal transfers are passed on
directly to households, are presented in appendix tables A1 and A2.
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6.2. Non-housing costs
According to intercity estimates of theConsumer Price Index (CPI), non-housing
cost differences are not always proportional to housing-cost differences, as we
assumed above. If non-housing costs in an area are high relative to housing
costs, then the cost-of-living measure approximated by housing costs is biased
downwards in that area. This causes QOL measures in areas with high non-
housing costs to be biased downwards. This may be the case in more remote
areas of Canada, such as the Territories, where housing is relatively cheap, but
other goods are expensive because of transportation costs.23
Unfortunately, only one city per province has detailed CPI information. As
a result, we need to assume that provincial cost differences are reflected in the
representative CMAs, typically each province’s largest. These adjustments, in
column 10, suggest that QOL and total values may be underestimated in the
Atlantic provinces, especially Newfoundland, and overestimated in Quebec.
6.3. Housing rents
Our main analysis measures housing costs by combining actual rents with im-
puted rents for owner-occupied units. There may be reason to doubt the accuracy
of these imputed rent measures, especially during our time period, as housing
prices in some markets rose considerably up until 2006. We construct alternate
measures using only rented units, whichwe plot in appendix figureA1 against our
main estimates of housing costs. Rents are strongly correlated with our measure
of housing costs, but vary less. As seen in column 11 of table 7, using rent-only
measures has a fairly minor effect on the overall rankings.
We believe rent-only measures are less accurate than our main measures.
Rental units tend to be more centrally located than owned units and hence
less representative of the overall CMA, especially as the majority of Canadians
own their homes. In addition, home-ownership rates are generally higher in larger
CMAs. Ourmain housing-cost measures are less prone to potential bias resulting
from sample-selection issues.
7. Conclusion
This paper presents the first hedonic estimates of QOL and local productiv-
ity differences for Canada, accounting for heterogeneity in mother tongues
and unionization rates. These measures seem sensible and intuitive, with the
QOL measures exhibiting a strong positive correlation with favourable climate,
23 Unfortunately, the intercity CPI estimates do not reliably measure housing costs, as they rely on
a subsample of new housing generally built on the urban fringe: ‘The sample of builders for
each metropolitan area is determined through the use of local market intelligence and verified
against relevant building permit data. Where possible, prices are collected from builders who
develop entire subdivisions, usually on large tracts of land.’ The Census sample is more reliable
as it samples all housing. For example in Vancouver, the CPI estimates that housing is only 10%
over the national average, as opposed to 43% according to the Census data.
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cultural amenities, and popular rankings.WefindVictoria has the greatest quality
of life, Toronto has the highest productivity, and Vancouver has the most valu-
able combination of the two. Among cities that they jointly inhabit, Canada’s
different language groups appear largely to agree on which cities are more at-
tractive, even when they live in different neighbourhoods. Local productivity
is largely determined by size, but is also affected by other factors such as pre-
dominant language, access to natural resources, and proximity to other large
cities.
Overall, our estimates measure how valuable different Canadian cities are,
not only in producing the goods that households value, but also in delivering the
amenities that households want. Most Canadians seem to prefer the amenities
of larger metropolitan areas and are willing to consume fewer goods in order to
live in them. In these larger metros, Canadians produce more valuable goods, to
the benefit of local land owners and the federal government. Despite Canada’s
enormous wealth in natural resources, the greatest resource Canadians seem to
value in production and consumption is each other.
Appendix
TABLE A1
Alternative quality-of-life measures using adjustments
Non-housing
Transfer-adjusted cost-adjusted Rent-adjusted
Base QOL QOL QOL QOL
Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Victoria 0.168 1 0.162 1 0.113 1 0.057 3
Vancouver 0.131 2 0.126 2 0.078 3 0.040 5
Kelowna 0.108 3 0.102 3 0.083 2 0.059 2
Abbotsford 0.055 4 0.049 6 0.045 4 0.001 15
Toronto 0.048 5 0.074 4 0.039 7 0.025 7
Calgary 0.040 6 − 0.036 21 0.004 14 − 0.003 16
Montreal 0.040 7 0.060 5 − 0.020 22 0.011 13
Sherbrooke 0.016 8 0.037 7 − 0.018 19 0.012 12
Ottawa-Hull 0.010 9 0.034 8 − 0.003 16 0.013 11
British
Columbia,
non-CMA
0.008 . 0.002 . 0.020 . − 0.024 .
Barrie 0.006 10 0.032 9 0.039 6 0.052 4
Halifax 0.005 11 − 0.024 19 0.034 9 0.060 1
Peterborough 0.004 12 0.030 10 0.040 5 0.020 8
Quebec 0.003 13 0.024 14 − 0.035 26 0.020 10
Kingston 0.002 14 0.028 11 0.037 8 0.020 9
(Continued)
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TABLE A1
(Continued)
Non-housing
Transfer-adjusted cost-adjusted Rent-adjusted
Base QOL QOL QOL QOL
Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Hamilton 0.001 15 0.027 12 0.023 10 − 0.009 20
Guelph − 0.002 16 0.024 13 0.020 11 − 0.004 18
Edmonton − 0.018 17 − 0.094 28 − 0.019 21 − 0.005 19
Kitchener − 0.028 18 − 0.002 15 0.003 15 − 0.012 21
Brantford − 0.033 19 − 0.007 16 0.013 12 − 0.017 24
St. Catharines-
Niagara
− 0.035 20 − 0.009 17 0.010 13 − 0.013 22
Prince Edward
Island
− 0.036 . − 0.071 . 0.024 . 0.049 .
Alberta,
non-CMA
− 0.043 . − 0.118 . − 0.024 . − 0.009 .
Oshawa − 0.044 21 − 0.018 18 − 0.018 18 − 0.023 27
Ontario,
non-CMA
− 0.045 . − 0.019 . 0.011 . − 0.030 .
Saskatoon − 0.050 22 − 0.107 30 − 0.032 25 0.005 14
Moncton − 0.053 23 − 0.090 26 − 0.018 20 0.033 6
Winnipeg − 0.054 24 − 0.093 27 − 0.047 28 − 0.003 17
London − 0.057 25 − 0.031 20 − 0.007 17 − 0.022 26
Yukon
Territory
− 0.058 . − 0.246 . − 0.058 . − 0.046 .
Quebec,
non-CMA
− 0.064 . − 0.043 . − 0.065 . − 0.041 .
Trois-Rivie`res − 0.079 26 − 0.058 22 − 0.085 32 − 0.045 29
St. John’s − 0.086 27 − 0.155 33 − 0.029 24 − 0.021 25
Regina − 0.086 28 − 0.143 32 − 0.064 31 − 0.014 23
Sudbury − 0.088 29 − 0.062 23 − 0.028 23 − 0.050 30
Nova Scotia,
non-CMA
− 0.089 . − 0.118 . − 0.002 . 0.006 .
Chicoutimi-
Jonquie`re
− 0.095 30 − 0.074 24 − 0.098 33 − 0.058 31
Saint John − 0.106 31 − 0.143 31 − 0.051 29 − 0.041 28
New
Brunswick,
non-CMA
− 0.106 . − 0.143 . − 0.039 . − 0.006 .
Windsor − 0.112 32 − 0.085 25 − 0.054 30 − 0.072 33
Northwest
Territory
− 0.115 . − 0.321 . − 0.115 . − 0.138 .
Manitoba,
non-CMA
− 0.119 . − 0.158 . − 0.068 . − 0.048 .
Thunder Bay − 0.125 33 − 0.099 29 − 0.044 27 − 0.063 32
Saskatchewan,
non-CMA
− 0.153 . − 0.210 . − 0.076 . − 0.028 .
Newfoundland,
non-CMA
− 0.228 . − 0.297 . − 0.103 . − 0.070 .
Nunavut
Territory
− 0.309 . − 0.590 . − 0.309 . − 0.387 .
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TABLE A2
Alternative total value measures using adjustments
Non-housing
Transfer-adjusted cost-adjusted Rent-adjusted
Base value value value value
Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Vancouver 0.179 1 0.174 1 0.126 1 0.088 2
Victoria 0.179 2 0.173 2 0.125 2 0.068 3
Toronto 0.115 3 0.141 3 0.105 3 0.092 1
Calgary 0.098 4 0.023 11 0.063 5 0.056 5
Kelowna 0.091 5 0.085 4 0.066 4 0.042 6
Montreal 0.058 6 0.079 6 − 0.002 15 0.030 9
Ottawa-Hull 0.056 7 0.080 5 0.043 6 0.059 4
Abbotsford 0.049 8 0.043 9 0.039 9 − 0.005 16
Guelph 0.020 9 0.046 7 0.042 7 0.018 10
Hamilton 0.020 10 0.046 8 0.042 8 0.010 11
Oshawa 0.012 11 0.038 10 0.038 10 0.033 7
Edmonton − 0.006 12 − 0.082 24 − 0.007 17 0.007 13
Kitchener − 0.008 13 0.019 12 0.024 11 0.009 12
Quebec − 0.009 14 0.011 13 − 0.048 23 0.007 14
Barrie − 0.016 15 0.010 14 0.017 12 0.030 8
British
Columbia,
non-CMA
− 0.018 . − 0.024 . − 0.005 . − 0.050 .
Kingston − 0.023 16 0.003 15 0.012 13 − 0.005 17
Peterborough − 0.027 17 − 0.001 16 0.009 14 − 0.010 18
Northwest
Territory
− 0.028 . − 0.233 . − 0.028 . − 0.050 .
Sherbrooke − 0.029 18 − 0.009 17 − 0.063 24 − 0.033 21
Yukon
Territory
− 0.047 . − 0.235 . − 0.047 . − 0.036 .
St. Catharines-
Niagara
− 0.051 19 − 0.024 18 − 0.005 16 − 0.028 20
Brantford − 0.055 20 − 0.028 19 − 0.008 18 − 0.038 22
Halifax − 0.057 21 − 0.086 25 − 0.028 21 − 0.002 15
London − 0.062 22 − 0.036 20 − 0.012 19 − 0.027 19
Alberta,
non-CMA
− 0.066 . − 0.142 . − 0.048 . − 0.033 .
Windsor − 0.080 23 − 0.054 21 − 0.023 20 − 0.040 23
Ontario,
non-CMA
− 0.084 . − 0.058 . − 0.028 . − 0.070 .
Sudbury − 0.091 24 − 0.065 22 − 0.031 22 − 0.053 25
Trois-Rivie`res − 0.102 25 − 0.081 23 − 0.109 30 − 0.068 29
Chicoutimi-
Jonquie`re
− 0.110 26 − 0.089 26 − 0.113 31 − 0.073 30
Winnipeg − 0.114 27 − 0.153 28 − 0.107 29 − 0.063 28
Saskatoon − 0.117 28 − 0.174 30 − 0.099 26 − 0.062 27
Quebec,
non-CMA
− 0.123 . − 0.103 . − 0.125 . − 0.101 .
Regina − 0.128 29 − 0.185 31 − 0.105 28 − 0.055 26
Moncton − 0.137 30 − 0.174 29 − 0.101 27 − 0.050 24
Thunder Bay − 0.154 31 − 0.128 27 − 0.073 25 − 0.092 31
(Continued)
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TABLE A2
(Continued)
Non-housing
Transfer-adjusted cost-adjusted Rent-adjusted
Base value value value value
Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
St. John’s − 0.175 32 − 0.244 33 − 0.118 32 − 0.109 32
Prince Edward
Island
− 0.186 . − 0.221 . − 0.125 . − 0.100 .
Saint John − 0.189 33 − 0.226 32 − 0.135 33 − 0.125 33
Nunavut
Territory
− 0.225 . − 0.506 . − 0.225 . − 0.303 .
New
Brunswick,
non-CMA
− 0.233 . − 0.270 . − 0.166 . − 0.133 .
Nova Scotia,
non-CMA
− 0.237 . − 0.266 . − 0.150 . − 0.142 .
Manitoba,
non-CMA
− 0.251 . − 0.290 . − 0.200 . − 0.180 .
Saskatchewan,
non-CMA
− 0.299 . − 0.356 . − 0.222 . − 0.174 .
Newfoundland,
non-CMA
− 0.375 . − 0.445 . − 0.251 . − 0.218 .
TABLE A3
Additional statistics by CMA
Fraction who
Union coverage Employment work in CMA Log CPI
CMA rate rate of residence non-housing
St. John’s 0.401 0.778 0.974 − 0.003
Halifax 0.346 0.818 0.980 0.010
Moncton 0.310 0.845 0.943 − 0.014
Saint John 0.342 0.812 0.973 − 0.014
Chicoutimi-Jonquie`re 0.541 0.751 0.951 − 0.053
Quebec 0.492 0.835 0.956 − 0.053
Sherbrooke 0.499 0.789 0.885 − 0.053
Trois-Rivie`res 0.542 0.791 0.850 − 0.053
Montreal 0.377 0.788 0.975 − 0.053
Ottawa-Hull 0.454 0.825 0.984 0.037
Kingston 0.460 0.783 0.935 0.037
Peterborough 0.430 0.841 0.834 0.037
Oshawa 0.425 0.841 0.566 0.037
Toronto 0.239 0.813 0.979 0.037
Hamilton 0.328 0.822 0.737 0.037
St. Catharines-Niagara 0.348 0.812 0.897 0.037
Kitchener 0.296 0.843 0.848 0.037
Brantford 0.312 0.824 0.721 0.037
Guelph 0.295 0.867 0.717 0.037
London 0.333 0.827 0.936 0.037
(Continued)
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TABLE A3
(Continued)
Fraction who
Union coverage Employment work in CMA Log CPI
CMA rate rate of residence non-housing
Windsor 0.421 0.775 0.953 0.037
Barrie 0.276 0.877 0.595 0.037
Sudbury 0.456 0.771 0.977 0.037
Thunder Bay 0.497 0.797 0.976 0.037
Winnipeg 0.423 0.837 0.973 − 0.041
Regina 0.444 0.855 0.981 − 0.029
Saskatoon 0.436 0.844 0.974 − 0.029
Calgary 0.228 0.847 0.982 − 0.004
Edmonton 0.298 0.821 0.977 − 0.004
Kelowna 0.253 0.830 0.956 0.009
Abbotsford 0.343 0.808 0.644 0.009
Vancouver 0.340 0.792 0.986 0.009
Victoria 0.384 0.825 0.983 0.009
Newfoundland, non-CMA 0.438 0.619 − 0.003
Prince Edward Island 0.377 0.798 − 0.004
Nova Scotia, non-CMA 0.345 0.734 0.010
New Brunswick, non-CMA 0.338 0.724 − 0.014
Quebec, non-CMA 0.479 0.779 − 0.053
Ontario, non-CMA 0.389 0.808 0.037
Manitoba, non-CMA 0.436 0.839 − 0.041
Saskatchewan, non-CMA 0.367 0.838 − 0.029
Alberta, non-CMA 0.257 0.848 − 0.004
British Columbia, non-CMA 0.402 0.790 0.009
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